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During the 2009 inﬂ   uenza (H1N1) pandemic, some 
countries used quarantine for containment or mitigation. Of 
152 quarantined university students we studied, risk for ill-
ness was higher for students quarantined in a room with a 
person with a conﬁ  rmed case; we found no difference be-
tween students quarantined in double or single rooms.
P
andemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza emerged in Mexico in 
March 2009 and by June 10 had rapidly spread to 74 
countries (1,2). Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza at the community level were recommend-
ed by the World Health Organization before and during 
the pandemic (3,4). One such nonpharmaceutical interven-
tion was quarantine of contacts of persons with conﬁ  rmed 
cases. A key question in closed settings (e.g., military bar-
racks) was how to prevent a secondary outbreak of inﬂ  u-
enza among those quarantined.
The ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 
mainland People’s Republic of China was imported from 
the United States and reported on May 11, 2009 (5). On 
May 29, the Chinese Ministry of Health required that each 
conﬁ  rmed case-patient and each contact be isolated and 
quarantined in 1 separate room to contain transmission 
of the virus (6). Containment efforts appeared to success-
fully prevent community spread until mid-August (7). The 
Chinese Ministry of Health adjusted the quarantine guide-
lines on August 20 and permitted incomplete quarantine of 
contacts (e.g., quarantining >1 contact in 1 room) (8). We 
conducted an observational study of a pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 outbreak among students of a university in northern 
China in September 2009. Our goal was to compare the ef-
fectiveness of different quarantine methods for preventing 
a secondary outbreak among the persons in quarantine.
The Study
During August 31–September 12, 2009, an outbreak of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 occurred among students of a uni-
versity in northern China. On August 31, pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was laboratory conﬁ  rmed in 6 students who had fever 
and acute upper respiratory symptoms. A subsequent in-
vestigation found that all of the conﬁ  rmed case-patients, 
along with 27 other students, had traveled by train from 
Shanghai to the university on the afternoon of August 28. 
One of the students (the index case-patient) had a cough 
during the trip on August 27. Another 5 students also had 
fever and inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms and visited the school 
medical services for treatment during August 28–30. When 
the outbreak was identiﬁ  ed, a total of 202 contacts (average 
age 21 years, range 19–23 years) were traced and imme-
diately quarantined in a separate dormitory on September 
1. Eighty-nine rooms (each with 1 toilet) and 9 apartments 
(each with 2 bedrooms and 1 toilet) were occupied. One or 
2 contacts were assigned to each bedroom. Other control 
measures, such as ventilating and disinfecting each room, 
wearing masks, and washing hands, were strictly imple-
mented in accordance with guidance provided by the Chi-
nese Ministry of Health (8).
Oropharyngeal swabs from all contacts were collected 
and tested on the ﬁ  rst day of quarantine (September 1). Vi-
rologic laboratory testing subsequently indicated that 39 
contacts were positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Among 
the 163 virus-negative contacts, 11 had fever (>38°C) or 
inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms at the beginning of the quarantine; 
the other 152 had no fever or inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms on 
September 1.
Among the 152 virus-negative contacts who had fever 
or inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms, 20 were exposed to a virus-
positive contact during quarantine; 19 shared a bedroom 
and a toilet with a virus-positive contact; and 1 shared a 
toilet but not a bedroom with a virus-positive contact. The 
other 132 were not exposed to any virus-positive contacts 
during quarantine, including 6 persons housed in single 
rooms and 126 sharing double rooms.
The temperature and symptoms of contacts were re-
corded 3× per day (8:00 AM, 2:00 PM, and 6:00 PM). We 
deﬁ  ned a suspected case as a virus-negative contact with 
sudden onset of fever >38°C and at least 1 of the follow-
ing symptoms: cough, sore throat, runny nose, shortness of 
breath, headache, body aches, fatigue, vomiting or diarrhea, 
and absence of other diagnoses. Students with suspected 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection who had high fever 
(>38.5°C) or severe respiratory symptoms (bad cough or 
dyspnea) were transferred to hospital for treatment; others 
who had fever <38.5°C or mild inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms 
were treated in the quarantine building. Because of a short-
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age of resources, laboratory testing of suspected case-pa-
tients in quarantine was not performed after the ﬁ  rst day.
Data were analyzed by using SPSS 15.0 (SPSS Inc., 
Chicago, IL, USA). χ2 test and Fisher exact test were used 
to compare the attack rates of suspected cases between the 
groups under different quarantine arrangements. A p value 
<0.05 was considered signiﬁ  cant.
During the quarantine, 14 suspected cases were iden-
tiﬁ  ed among 152 virus-negative contacts, but none had 
high fever (>38.5°C) or severe respiratory symptoms. Of 
19 initially virus-negative contacts sharing a room with a 
virus-positive contact, 5 suspected cases were identiﬁ  ed; 
onset of symptoms occurred during September 2–8. Also, 
of 126 initially virus-negative contacts who shared a room 
with a virus-negative contact, 9 suspected cases were iden-
tiﬁ  ed; onset of symptoms occurred during September 2–7 
(Table, Figure). The attack rate of suspected cases differed 
signiﬁ  cantly between the 2 groups (p = 0.02, 2-tailed Fisher 
exact test).
Among 132 initially virus-negative contacts, who 
were not exposed to a virus-positive contact during the 
quarantine, no suspected cases were identiﬁ  ed among the 
6 students in single rooms, but 9 students with suspected 
infection were identiﬁ  ed among 126 students in double 
rooms; onset of symptoms occurred during September 2–7 
(Table; Figure). Attack rates for suspected cases between 
the virus-negative contacts in single rooms and those in 
double rooms did not differ signiﬁ  cantly (p = 1.00, 2-tailed 
Fisher exact test). All students with suspected infection had 
normal temperature with no inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms after 
September 9, and all quarantined persons were released by 
September 12.
Conclusions
In our study, the attack rate of suspected cases among 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus–negative contacts increased 
signiﬁ  cantly when persons were quarantined in the same 
room or used the same bathroom as a virus-positive contact 
(p = 0.02, 2-tailed Fisher exact test). Nevertheless, quar-
antining each virus-negative contact in 1 room did not sig-
niﬁ  cantly decrease the attack rate of suspected cases among 
virus-negative contacts in comparison with quarantining 2 
persons in 1 room. Our results support the effectiveness of 
quarantine in preventing a secondary outbreak of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 among contacts of conﬁ  rmed cases. Our re-
sults also support quarantining 2 virus-negative contacts in 
1 room in situations where a large number of contacts have 
been traced but space is limited. Whether our ﬁ  ndings sup-
port quarantining >2 contacts in 1 room deserves further 
study.
During the quarantine, every room was routinely dis-
infected by university staff 1 × per day. Compliance of all 
contacts with regulations governing personal protection 
and hygiene was good. Also, staff were assigned to super-
vise the behavior of contacts in quarantine. These control 
measures did not contribute to the differences of the attack 
rate of suspected cases between the different cohorts in this 
study.
Our study is limited in that virologic laboratory con-
ﬁ  rmation of suspected cases was not available. However, 
no other respiratory infections were known to be circulat-
ing at that time in the student population, and pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 is probably the most likely explanation for 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness in recent contacts of laboratory-con-
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Table. Evaluation of suspected cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 152 quarantined persons who were virus-negative at the start
of quarantine during an outbreak in northern People’s Republic of China, 2009 
Group Total no. No. suspected No. uninfected p value*
Exposed to virus-positive contacts
  Sharing same room and toilet 19 5 14 0.02†
  Sharing same toilet and different room 10 1
Not exposed to virus-positive contacts
  Quarantined 1 to a room 6 0 6 1.00‡
  Quarantined 2 to a room 126 9 117
Total 152 14 138
*2-tailed Fisher exact test. 
†p value for the comparison between attack rates of suspected cases among the virus-negative contacts comparing those sharing the same room and 
toilet with a virus-positive contact and those sharing the same room and toilet with a virus-negative contact. 
‡p value for the comparison between attack rates of suspected cases among the virus-negative contacts not exposed to the virus-positive contacts 
compared with those quarantined in single rooms and those in double rooms. 
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Figure. Number of new suspected cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
infection per day among 152 quarantined persons who were virus-
negative at the start of quarantine during an outbreak in northern 
People’s Republic of China, 2009.ﬁ  rmed cases. Lack of laboratory testing also means that we 
may have underestimated the attack rate during quarantine; 
some secondary infections may have been associated with 
asymptomatic or subclinical disease.
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